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Abstract 
This paper attempts to study, from the perspective of historical comparison, the development of reform in China’s 
political and economic system during the past 30 years and the nature of the governance crisis. Through a 
comparative analysis, the paper believes that the governance crisis currently facing China is a “transformational 
crisis”, namely a governance crisis arising from various conflicting interests and the backwardness in governance 
capability during the economic-social transformational process, similar to the variety of transformational crises that 
historically beset Western societies. This type of transformational crisis has adversely impacted the state’s governing 
capabilities in multiple ways, thus giving rise to institutional reform. China’s 30 years’ reform in the political and 
economic system has promoted the nation’s marketization and democratization processes, which is an inevitable 
phenomenon of structural transformation under a particular historical context. In reality, marketization and 
democratization, and economic-social transformation are of reciprocal causation relations. The economic-social 
transformation will inevitably incur governing crises to varying degrees on the national level, but will also boost the 
reform and transformation of the state governance system. The reform and transformation in China’s state 
governance system is a progressive and structural adaptation to the economic-social transformation. China has not 
been trapped in partial reform, nor will it be led into Soviet-type institutional collapse; on the contrary, it is more 
likely to realize the transformation and development of the state governance system with the progressive model of 
crisis-reform-adaptation. 
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Forum. 
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Issues and Theoretical Perspectives 
China’s 30 years of reform and opening-up has undergone significant social and economic 
transformations and a series of transformational crises in terms of state governance. Both home and 
abroad scholars are divided over the nature of the transformational crises facing the nation as well as the 
potential consequences of the transformational crises. The main focus of controversy lies whether China’s 
current political system has trapped in a governance crisis. In particular, after disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, some scholars think that it would be difficult for China to escape a Soviet-like “institutional 
collapse”, due to its political system and structural characteristics. Benefiting from China’s successful 
entry into the WTO at the end of the 20th century, China has gain rapid and ongoing economic growth, 
some hold that China can hardly resolve the issue of the governance challenges caused by marketization 
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and globalization to its political system, thereby China’s “partial reform” has been caught in the state of 
“trapped transformation”. Concerning “China collapses” itheory, scholars put forward distinctive view 
toward it. For instance, some of them maintain that although China faces tremendous challenges in its 
regime legitimacy, its national system and structure, to some extent, still endowed with necessary 
adaptability to reconstruct the national governance framework, so as to address the increasingly complex 
and challenging governance problemsii
    From the analysis of the “China Collapses” theory, we can find the shadow of institutional 
determinism of the neo-institutional school. Traditional institutionalists tend to emphasize the decisive 
factors of institutions but overlook their intrinsic nature or dependence on the existing political, economic 
and social conditions. They simply divide institutions as per their theoretical efficiency and efficacy, 
furthermore, they maintain that the good institutions can be devised and implemented through rational 
discussions.
.       
iii
For a long time, the mainstream school of comparative politics studies has primarily focused on the 
popularization of the democratic systems and the democratic transition. The democratic political systems, 
as a preinstalled value preference and an unquestioned historical trend, have become a basic paradigm of 
comparative political studies, thus establishing the domination of “teleology” and “typology” in American 
politics.
 This theory has extensive influence in Chinese academia, most of those people excessive 
emphasis on the importance of institutional choice and design but ignorance over that of reform policies 
and strategic options. In particular, this theory has confused the different nature and differentiation 
between transformational crises and state governance crises, which is related to the paradigm of the 
mainstream school of transformational comparative studies. Even those who disagree with “the Collapse 
Theory” have not understood this fully.  
iv  Pursuant to this model, political development is viewed as a parallel transition from the 
traditional, autocratic and authoritarian political system to a democratic one, which emphasizes on a 
dynamic analysis of democratization and the political conditions for the consolidation of the democratic 
systems. Following the third wave of democratization, scholars in the field of the democratization and 
comparative politics began to find that the issue of democratic development and consolidation cannot be 
separated from state governance and economic development. And the analytical focus has also turned 
from unitary political democratization to a comparative study of the structural and governance 
performance of the new-born democratic systems. For instance, Adam Przeworski’s comparative study of 
East Europe and Latin America combined political democratization and economic marketization, with 
special emphasis on the interdependence of political and economic transformations. Robert Kaufman also 
applied the new analytical perspective of political economics in the comparative study of democratic 
transformation. v  While the abovementioned studies have enriched the theoretical observations of 
democratic transformations, they have not fully departed from the basic analytical model of “teleology” 
and “typology”, which, to some degree, neglects the different features of democratization or market-
oriented transformations between nations due to the profound longitudinal social and historical differences. 
In particular, the pre-established prerequisite of viewing institutional transformation merely as a 
substitutional transition between two opposing systems would not only overlook the commonness in 
governance among nations with different institutions, but to some extent deny the historical fact that state 
governance can achieve virtual transformation through institutional reform and adaptation.vi
    Then, has China really lapsed into the “transformational trap” after the 30 years’ reform and 
development during the social-economic transformation process, or is it still going through the fine-tuning 
and reconstruction of state governance? The answer lies in the demonstrated appraisal of state capacity, 
rather than in the classical democratic theory and market economy theory. Every kind of problem that the 
transitional nations encounter cannot be separated from the scope of state governance. Hence, it is 
necessary to incorporate the concept of state governance into our analysis framework and identify the 
challenges that social and economic transformation create to the state governance, and the adaptation and 
self-adjustment capability of state governance system as important variables for review. Meanwhile, in 
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order to judge whether state governance has the adaptability, we will need to differentiate two different 
types of crises theoretically: transformational crisis and state governance crisis.  
To begin with, it is necessary to define the basic nature of state governance. In modern political 
analysis, state governance usually refers to the process in which the highest state authority implements 
control and regulation over the society through executive, legislative and judicial organs, as well as the 
division of power between the central state and local levels. The foremost and fundamental purpose of 
state governance is to maintain political ordervii and guarantee the ongoing authoritative allocation of 
social values by the government.viii From this basic definition, the performance of state governance has 
been related to the legitimacy, organization, effectiveness and stability of the state and the government. It 
is based on this perception that Samuel Huntington recognized the critical political distinction among 
nations as the validity of peaceful and stable governance, rather than the form of government, and 
identified the necessary conditions of effective governance as “the possession of a powerful, adaptive and 
cohesive political system”. ix  With such consideration, Francis Fukuyama ascribed the root of many 
serious problems in the world to the weakness, incapacity and failure of state governance, and then 
explore the governance difficulty in the 21st century from several dimensions, such as, public executive 
capacity, the extent and enforcement of state functionx
     Secondly, to further analysis, it is necessary to differentiate between transformational crises and 
governance crises. Transformational crises mainly refer to the economic and social sphere, with two basic 
features as follows: 1) enormous economic and social contradictions and conflicts due to significant 
structural changes between social and economic relationship; 2) as these contradictions and conflicts 
cannot be remedied in the economic and social fields by themselves, intervention from the state become a 
must. Based on these two features, the transformational crises will go through two stages. In the first stage, 
the upheaval of the original economic and social relationships will seriously impact people’s traditional 
perceptions and behaviours, and break the relative balance of the original economic-social relationships, 
thus incurring considerable conflicts and contradictions in people’s economic and social interactions. 
When these conflicts and contradictions cannot be settled among economic organizations, social groups 
and individuals, there comes the second stage when state intervention will become the necessary means of 
handling these problems and controlling the crises. By contrast, state governance crises refer to the state 
when   government (country) is incapable of controlling and managing social conflicts and contradictions 
effectively in a particular time period. This will then badly weaken the government’s governability. State 
governance crises also have two basic features: 1) they are not the state of political emergency and 
instability brought about by some major occurrences, but the institutional dilemma facing state 
governance, namely the multiple and widespread decline and weakening in the state governance capability; 
2) the state governance system has serious defects that cannot be overcome and the rigid system can not 
be adjusted effectively on its own. Based on these two characteristics, state governance crises would also 
go through two stages. In the first stage, when the conflicts and contradictions arising from economic-
social transformation began to go beyond the capability of the state governance system, some functions of 
the state governance system will fail; coupled with the increasing social pressure from the outside of the 
system, the original governance functions would undergo institutional decline, engendering the state’s 
proactive or passive reform in the governance system. In the second stage, if the state governance system 
failed to effectively adjust itself and fulfil transformations adaptable to the governance functions under the 
context of increasing social pressure, or its functions weakened substantially in the social reform and 
significant political revolution process, there will be severe systematic crises manifested in the decision-
making authority and executive ability.          
     
    It is necessary to differentiate the nature and differences between transformational crises and state 
governance crises, as they will provide some theoretical explanation for the fact that the transformational 
crises have incurred the collapse of political and governance systems in some countries but not in others. 
On a more extensive theoretical level, the distinctive results of the political and economic system reforms 
in different transformational countries ever since the third democratic wave lie in, to a large extent, the 
119 Xu Xianglin /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  116 – 137 
differences of various governance systems’ ability in dealing with transformational crises and their varied 
self-remedying and fine-tuning capability when confronted by governance crises, rather than whether 
there are transformational crises. It is worth noting that, during the drastic economic and social 
transformational stages, the state governability often lags behind. If the transformational crises are not 
promptly settled or effectively controlled, and getting time to enlarge the risk, they may turn into state 
governance crises and even incur the collapse of the political system. The disintegration of the former 
Soviet Union in 1991 is a good reflection of this logic. On the contrary, if the state governability can 
maintain regular operation and self-adjustment during the transformational crises and effectively dissolve 
social political conflicts or control the level of deterioration, the state governance system will be refined 
and improved through self-remedying efforts.  
What does China’s 30 years’ transformation look alike? How to locate China's 30 years' practice in the 
two types of transitional crises? In other words, is China more likely to control or temper transformational 
crises through the adjustment of the existing governance system to realize a successful transformation 
toward marketization and democratization suitable to China’s context, or to degenerate to state 
governance crises (or transformational trap) and eventually tend towards institutional “collapse”? To 
answer these questions, we will need to understand the substantial content and progress of China’s 
transformation and develop a necessary understanding and empirical analysis over the nature of China’s 
transformation, the intensity of the crises, and the adjustment and adaptability in the state governance 
system. To better understand the nature of China’s transformations, it is also beneficial to review in a 
comparative manner the historical experiences of the economic-social transformations in major Western 
countries.       
In general, Western developed countries have gone through two major historical transformations in the 
past century, which can be categorized into two basic processes namely economic marketization process 
and political democratization process. The modernization process of later developing countries would also 
be influenced by these two processes. Similar to the modernization process in other developing countries, 
China’s reform and opening-up process over the past 30 years was also carried through in the two 
domains of marketization and democratization. The governance crises arising from the transformations in 
the two domains are in essence identical to those in other countries, but the path and manner of the state 
governance transformations can be viewed as a adaptively incremental reform of governance.   
This paper tries to explain, with a historical comparison and a more extensive context of economic-
social structural transformations the development path of China’s political and economic reform over the 
past 30 years and the nature of the governance crises confronting it. Although democratization and 
marketization are still considered as two important variables in the transformations, the starting point of 
my analysis is to view the two aspects as the inevitable phenomenon rather than the values and goals of 
structural transformation under specific historical background. In reality, marketization and 
democratization are reciprocal causation with economic-social transformations, which have incurred 
series of crises and difficulties in economic and social management, hence promoting the reform and 
transformation of the state governance system. This thesis will elaborate on these four basic arguments: 
firstly, the governance crisis is a normal history in the transition period which is accompanied with each 
country’s economic and social developmental process. The basic reason lies in the shock of the economic-
social structural changes to the political system and governability; secondly, though the reasons and 
contents of governance crises among countries are similar in the same developmental stage (e.g., the 
industrialization stage or post-industrialization stage), the adjustment of the governance strategy may vary 
due to the differences in their formation and evolvement of the history, culture and political institutions 
respectively. Hence, there is no identical model for other countries to duplicate; thirdly, there is 
remarkable difference in state governance reflected by the choice of development strategy with regard to 
China’s 30 years before and after the reform and opening-up. The governance model of the 30 years after 
the reform is characterized by a transition from “totalism” of the 30 years before to the current 
“democracy and the rule of law”, which has been accompanied by China’s market-oriented development 
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and social structural transformations, with governance crises as the direct impetus; fourthly, according to 
the experience and development trend gained in the 30 years’ governance transformations, the 
transformational crises in China will not necessarily bring about the “institutional collapse” held by some 
Western academia. On the contrary, it will more likely to help reconstruct a relatively stable new 
institutional system of state governance through the progressive process of crises, reform and adaptation. 
 
1. Historical References from Developed Countries in Terms of Social Transformations and 
Governance Crises 
Throughout the modern times, major countries in the world have in general gone through two large-
scale historical transformations and governance crises, namely the industrialization and post-
industrialization transformations, both of which have caused similar governance crises to the leading 
countries.  
 There is considerable literature on the description and analysis of “the Industrial Revolution” and the 
serious social conflicts incurred during the industrial capitalism period. In the description about the 
development of capitalism, we will see substantial social contradictions and conflicts, apart from the 
affluent wealth created by capitalism. From the Enclosure Movement of “Sheep devouring Men” in the 
early stage of capitalism to The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1845 by Engels, from the 
destruction of machines by workers to the labor movements one after another and the socialist movement 
in the 20th century, as well as the two world wars and the Great Depression, etc., all these occurrences 
have revealed the various social conflicts and contradictions that major capitalist countries had undergone 
during the industrialization transformation period. The great Transformation authored by Karl Polanyi in 
1944 has conducted an in-depth analysis on the social contradictions that Western countries encountered 
during their industrialization transformation period. This book described the great transformation of 
European civilization from the pre-industrial society to the industrialization age and the concurrent 
transformations in mindset, ideology, social and economic policies in this process. As an opponent of 
market self-regulation and Iaissez-faire capitalism, Polanyi revealed the dehumanization of market 
economy. He believed that the self-regulation of market economy was quite incompatible to the social 
structure, which was founded through national conduct in England in the 18th century by utopians. The 
introduction of Nature State into the society should have built up idyllic restrictions and mutual 
obligations to protect individuals, but actually it brought about inequality, war, oppression and chaos, 
thereby jeopardizing social justice and peace. xi
Polanyi’s description and analysis of the social conflicts during the industrialization transformation 
period and the birth of his theoretical views are closely related to the time when during which he lived. As 
an economist, he was not only long engaged in the study of Western economic history, but has witnessed 
“the tremendous hardship inseparable from the transformational times”, such as “social and economic 
chaos, stagnant and disastrous ups and downs, inflation, massive unemployment, changes in social status 
and the sudden collapse of historical countries”.
 His theoretical viewpoints seem way too sharp for those 
opponents, but many of is theories he proposed are widely cited and discussed, such as the 
“embeddedness” and “disembedding” concepts and the “Doubleaction-movement” theory to delineate the 
self-protection effect applied by the society to the market economy. 
xii What Polanyi indicated here was not the governance 
crisis of a certain individual country, but the crises in the Western industrial society and governance 
structure formed from the entire Industrial Revolution in Europe to the end of the First World War. The 
inborn defects of the social and governance structure do not lie in industrialness, but in the self-regulated 
nationwide market economy and the wild intervention by the government for non-economic purposes, 
including international balance of power, the gold standard system, free countries and self-regulated 
market economy. By 1944, however, these aspects were basically lost. For this reason, Polanyi foreboded 
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at the opening chapter of his book, “the civilization of the 19th century has fallen apart”.xiii
America has also suffered from such great transformation when the drastic industrialization swept over 
during the Progressive Era. Historian Steven J. Diner has depicted in meticulous details the various social 
contradictions and political changes of this period in his works. In the prologue of his book, he briefly 
described the social conflicts and contradictions, saying that “we live in such a world which, on the one 
hand, is destroying the traditional opportunities, but on the other, is displaying a thrilling new outlook.” 
However, what accompanied such a prospect is the outburst of class conflicts in the rural and urban areas, 
the violent clashes between employers and employees due to strike actions, the bankruptcy of farmers 
owing to an unexpected market, the increase in the number of land-lost farmers, peasants and land renters, 
the accelerated decline of small business owners, independent farmers and handicraft workers, the rapid 
development of large scale corporations and the competition for capital and labor, the widening gap 
between the rich and the poor in American families, and the middle class’s awareness that they lost their 
control not only over the society but over their own lives and the eager anticipation of government 
intervention. On the political side, the corrupted political leaders manipulated the municipal and most of 
the state governments. They managed to cater to the migrants and working class electorate with petty 
favors. Meanwhile, they depended upon bribes from electric bus companies, railways, public enterprises 
and contractors; The Trust manipulated representatives and used the court and federal power to suppress 
the dissidence from farmers and workers; corporate capitalism has become the momentum of the society, 
while all the others aspects such as the politics and reforms were merely the outcomes of it, etc.
 Although in his 
opinion, the end of the Second World War marked the worst experience in the transformation, people of 
the time  have paid a high price for such transformations. Whatever attitudes people may hold towards 
Polanyi’s theoretical views, the social conflicts and governance crises in the time of European 
industrialization transformations that he analyzed are hard historical facts.  
xiv There 
are many other historians concerned about all the economic-societal and political issues at that time as 
well. Most of them believed that the rapid industrialization, caused considerable societal-economic 
problems and social conflicts crammed into the country. As a result, all kinds of crises, class conflicts in 
special, have burst through the entire society. . xv
But the Progressive Era in America, as is named, is notable for the political reform and social progress. 
As a response to the large amount of social political conflicts and governance crises due to the 
industrialization and societal-economic transformation, the elites from all social circles boosted the 
progressive movement and gained leadership eventually in reconstructing harmony in the American 
society.
      
 xvi  The progressive movement has also fostered remarkable changes and transitions in the 
American political system and governance structure, such as enlarging the democracy, the regulating the 
economy, advocating social just, strengthening social control and enhancing government efficiency, etc. 
which have effectively tempered inter-class conflicts and laid a foundation for the subsequent American 
social revolution and state capacity building.xvii
The emergence of the third technological revolution following the Second World War  has promoted 
the growth of productivity and economy in major capitalist countries, hereby them to be economically 
giants in the end. Their economy are so strong to influence steadily the politics as well as the economy all 
over the world. These countries’ economies played a significant role in the world with enormous 
economic and political influence. In general, people think the time between mid 1950s and early 1970s is 
the golden era of capitalism because of the high speed of economic development, while from early 1970s 
to 1980s it is characteristics of the period of economic stagnation with low growth of economy in Western 
countries. There is still lack of explicit theoretical statements on whether the economic and social 
development in Western countries after the Second World War can be seen as another transition after the 
industrialization transformation. But from relevant literature, the feature of transformation is obvious. In 
the 1930s and 1940s, the Nobel Prize laureates in economics such as Hoffman, Kuznets and Samuelson 
studied meticulously the development stage and growth pattern of industrialization in developed capitalist 
countries. According to their authoritative argumentation, the earlier industrialization countries such as 
  
122   Xu Xianglin /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  116 – 137 
Britain, the United States and Japan have gone through four development stages, namely the “flying-off” 
stage before the Industrial Revolution, the “early economic growth” stage of the late 19
xviii      
th century, the 
development stage after the second Industrial Revolution and the post-1950s stage. Kuznets calls the 
development in the third stage “modern economic growth” and the fourth one “information-based 
economic growth”. Later, in 1960, American sociologist D. Bell, for the first time, used the term “post-
industrial society” in his book to describe the new social structure emerged in the second half of the 20th 
century in the industrial society and thought that such a structure would give rise to a new social model in 
the 21th century in the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and Western Europe.  
The postindustrial transformation starting from the 1950s has brought tremendous social problems, 
conflicts and various crises to the state governance as well. The social turbulence happened in major 
European countries and the United State in the late 1960s and the consequent so-called “neo-social 
movement” by Alain Touraine, one of the most noted sociologists in France, can be treated as the most 
symbolic historical events for this transformational crisis. As Touraine once stated on the influence of 
“neo-social movement”, it will become the beginning of a new battle, not merely a cutting edge of a crisis. 
The new battle is fundamental to our society and will persist, just like the labor movement in the process 
of industrial capitalism.xix Charles Tilly argued that upon reflection of the conflicts between the United 
States and other regions in the world in 1968, people developed such a viewpoint that the “old” social 
movement for the benefit of the workers and other exploited groups had passed its heyday; many 
observers held the opinion that the “new” social movement characterized by self-rule, self-expression and 
criticism of the postindustrial society was pushing aside and replacing the “old social movement”. The 
new social movement has also extended from postindustrial oppression indicated by Touraine in the 
earlier stage to a wider realm of woman’s rights, homosexual rights, rights and interests of the aboriginal 
residents, environmental protection, etc. xx
The sweeping new social movement that appeared in the 1960s among affluent western countries 
indeed brought about considerable governance crises to these countries, so much so that some leading 
politicians, columnists, scholars and even the people tended to have a pessimistic thought: is democracy in 
crisis? A research report by a trilateral committee of three notable scholars in the 1970s conducted 
pragmatic analysis over the governance crises from political, social, economic and cultural causes. For 
instance, according to French scholar Michel Crozier’s analysis over European governance crises, the 
crises came from internal political and economic chaos with structural reasons including the increase in 
social interactions, the influence of economic growth (inflation), the collapse of the traditional system, the 
confusion in the intelligentsia, the impact of the public media, the changes and contradictions in political 
belief and value structures, and the disparity between expressively values and actual behavior. The 
political consequences were characterized by the authoritative decline in the decision-making system, the 
overburden of the bureaucratic system and the lack of civic responsibilities. In light of the analysis by 
American scholar Samuel Huntington, the wave of social movement in the 1960s was the product of the 
drastic social and cultural transformations and convulsion, which was related to America’s entry into the 
so-called postindustrial society and the dramatic democracy revival movement. Thanks to this movement, 
the public began to challenge the authority of the fixed political, social and economic institutions; the 
intellectual and other social elites resumed their belief in equality; the minority and the female were 
awakened to their political and economic rights; the society was brimming with the spirit of protest and 
equality and the enthusiasm for exposing and deterring inequality; the form of civilian participation made 
remarkable achievement as well. However, the expansion and vitality of democracy, the growth of 
government activities, the decline in political authority, the challenge of democracy to authority, the 
decrease in public confidence and trust, the downfall of the party system, the equilibrium conversion 
between the ruling party and opposing parties, and all other changes have caused disturbance and 
imbalance in democratic politics. According to Japanese scholar Joji Watanuki, the decline in 
governability of democracies was caused by both exterior and interior environment. Interior elements 
refers to the pressure from the society and turbulence of the political ruling, such as the political 
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romanticism arising from urbanization and rising education, the new generation’s changes in political 
belief, social values and economic values, the decline in the governability of the leadership, the 
postponement in decision-making, and the political disputes of multipartism, etc. xxi
Although the three scholars have different explanations over the content and reason of the social 
turbulence and governance crises to the three countries and regions respectively during the 1960s (which 
was related to the differences in their historical conditions and social environment of economic 
development), they share a issue in common, that is, the imbalance in economic, cultural and political 
development during social transformations. The problems are not only concerning institution and policy 
(though the adjustment and improvement hereof is necessary), but also structural, just as the 
transformation is structural. Even today, the social political pressure and national governance problems 
intrinsic in the neo-politics and new social movement of post-modernization are still bothering the major 
developed countries in the West.
      
xxii
How did these countries address the governance crises in the transition period are beyond the scope of 
this article. But here, I would like to emphasize that the occurrence of transformational governance crises 
is common, no exception to these “model” Western developed countries which was once set as. The two 
stages of transitional crises in the modern history of developed countries at least revealed to some extent, 
that the governance crises in transition are not necessarily related to certain political systems, just as the 
economic growth is not necessarily the concomitance with the democratic system. xxiii
   
  
 
Hence, we can 
come to the conclusion that the best way to address the transitional governance crises does not lie in a so-
called perfect institutional system. The key point is whether the existing system can adjust itself to deal 
with the transitional governance crises successfully. It is particularly important for post-developing 
countries  (including China) to identify the crisis and choose appropriate strategies. 
2. Market-oriented Social Transformations and Governance Crisis in China 
In recent years, many oversee Chinese scholars have begun to pay attention to the transitional history 
of industrial countries in the 19th and early 20th century, and compared the governance issues of China’s 
market-based transformation with that in the history of developed countries. Compared to the Progressive 
Era, scholars found that China’s reform and opening-up practice share much historical similarities with 
America in terms of transitionall governance.xxiv Some Chinese scholars also began to conduct special 
studies over America’s “progressive era”. xxv They mostly tried to learn lessons and experience from 
America as references for China. Other scholars intended to further exploring the vital social problems 
emerged with the industrialization in the Europe and America., Polanyi’s analysis in The Great 
Transformations could provide valuable theoretical framework for warning against the prevalent neo-
liberalism inclination in China’s market economy theory, if the trend continues, the disembedding effects 
of free market and the potential catastrophe would definitely destroy both the society and the 
environment.xxvi Whether for taking lessons or taking warnings from the West, these aforementioned 
scholars share an evident anxiety and concern, which is associated with the governance crisis in China’s 
current transformations. The basic fact is that, though China has made tremendous achievements in 
economic growth, the social and environmental costs and governance crisis incurred hereof is also 
unprecedented. Although China faces similar transitional governance crisis with Europe and America, due 
to the differences in historical, cultural and political traditions between them, it symbolizes otherness in 
both the form and the means of transition and governance. To be specific, thanks to the market economy, 
China has upgraded its economic growth ever since the reform and opening-up, but its “strong state” 
governance model will continue in spite of the institutional and functional adjustments, and will play a 
significant part in addressing domestic economic development issues, maintaining social order and 
tackling the globalization and the worldwide financial crisis.  
124   Xu Xianglin /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  116 – 137 
The market-oriented economic reform starting from 1978 has gradually deregulated the state control 
over the economy and the individual lifestyle. Generally, marketization went through four stages.xxvii 
Although China’s path to the market economy was pushed forward step by step, the Chinese market 
economy process, when compared with that of Western developed countries in the modern times, is still 
very fast, together with severe challenges in the economy, society, environment and state governance. To 
begin with, with regard to the market economy itself, the development path was seasonal, with growth, 
stagnation even economic crises, which required timely and appropriate intervention by the state. The 
biggest challenge in the early stage of economic transformations was the price reform bottleneck triggered 
by “decentralization of authority and transfer of profits” and the “double-track pricing system”. The 
failure of the price reform implemented by the government in 1988 caused social discontent and 
turbulence. The economic transformation in the first half of 1990s encountered a series of problems 
including local economic separation, repeated construction and economic bubble, etc.xxviii
The 
first stage (1979-1984) was marked by the emergence of the small-scale sporadic commodity trading 
market between individuals and the collective, which was the budding stage of China’s market-oriented 
economy when the central government treated individual and collective economy as a supplement to the 
socialist planned economy on the policy level. In this stage, the role of it in the overall economy was quite 
limited and the executive power still had strong intervention over such economic activities. The second 
stage (1985-1992) was characterized by the release of various reform policies and measures related to the 
market system. The percentage and influence of planned economy began to wither while that of the 
market economy started to rise; meanwhile, market rules such as equivalent exchange, supply-demand 
relation, competition, etc. started to play a critical part in people’s economic life. In the third stage (1993-
1999), market economy began to dominate China’s economic development pattern. With China’s entry 
into the WTO, state-owned enterprises’ participation in the market economy system and the market-based 
penetration in terms of labor, capital and land resources, market rules not only permeated the entire 
economic realm, but extended to the domains of utilities and social life such as education, health care, 
working insurance, housing, etc. The fourth stage (2000 - ) is the adjustment for market reform and 
progress when the state put forward the guideline of “balanced economic and social development” on the 
development strategy level. While stressing the deepening of the economic system reform, the central 
government also started to attach importance to the policy-making and investment in social development.  
 
Secondly, marketization has even brought more serious problems and challenges to the society and 
environment, especially since the mid and later stage of the 1990s. In early 1990s following the 
disintegration of Soviet Union and the East European regime, the political pledge “development is of 
fundamental significance” advocated by Deng Xiaoping had strategic international significance. In order 
to boost economic prosperity and enhance national power, China must promote the marketization reform 
and build up a healthy market economy. However, the development of the market economy changed not 
only China’s economic structure but the social structure, and brought about diversified social interests and 
new social problems and conflicts as well. It generated irreversible impacts on people’s lifestyle, mindset, 
values and the natural environment, etc. All these factors have posed new challenges to the national 
governance structure and capability. 
the economic 
development has made China bid farewell to the traditionally planned “shortage economy” and turned to 
the age of “surplus economy”, when state-owned enterprises were caught in a “dilemma”. The 
“transformation” (privatization) of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) caused the loss of state assets and the 
impedance of “modern management system reform” by government authorities in charge. The export-
oriented economic development model also suffered from the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, the 
international trade frictions, the impact of the global financial crisis starting from 2008, etc. All such 
difficulties, challenges and crises cannot be tackled by the market itself, and must rely on the 
government’s macroeconomic regulation measures and timely and appropriate policy interventions.        
The market economy is competition-oriented, but the sufficient conditions for “Pareto Optimal” 
competition assumed by classical economists were either too harsh or nonexistent in reality. Therefore, 
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without regulation under marketization would necessarily sharpen the stratified differentiation, the gap 
between the rich and the poor and class conflicts; the market-oriented capital and enterprises would 
inevitably bring forth exploitation of the commercialized labor, the deceiving consumers, irresponsible 
neglect of market externalities, etc. Besides, with the rapid urbanization process in China, a great deal of 
surplus labor, “floating population” or “migrant workers” in particular, has been flowing into the city, 
they could not be treated fairly on their working opportunities, revenue and the living conditions in the 
city due to their non-residence identity and exclusion from the urban social welfare system. The various 
social problems and conflicts once happened in the transformational history of Western developed 
countries were fully represented in China’s transition period, especially in the recent 10-20 years. xxix
Thirdly, China’s market-oriented economic and social transformation brought forth not only serious 
social and environmental problems during the industrial transformation period assumed by Polanyi, but 
social, economic, cultural revolutions and the “new social movement” are similar to that in the post-
industrial transformation of the West in the 1960s. The deregulation of the traditional “household 
registration system”, the disaggregation of “entity ownership”, coupled with urbanization and the 
marketization of labour promoted the immense increase in social fluidity. Marketization has changed 
people’s social values, and materialism has become the integral standards for social exchange 
activities.
 
Marketization has also caused serious problems in the rural areas. The rapid development of 
industrialization and urbanization would require a large amount of arable land, while the national 
deficiency in the policy and execution of land management has inflicted the loss of vast farmland which 
badly impacted the farmland base line to guard food safety. To make things worse, the disordered process 
of “agricultural people being given non-agricultural status” in land use has also engendered the serious 
issue of “land-lost farmers”. As the collectively-owned land in China’s rural areas is obscure in the nature 
of ownership, and the state would mainly make compensations for land expropriation, local government 
can firstly acquire land via traditional regulations at a relatively low price and then sell it to the enterprises 
and developers at a higher commercial price. The high price difference produced through traditional land 
acquisition policy and market-based transfer via land bidding has thus become the important source of 
financial revenue for many local governments. However, the social cost of such market-oriented system 
transformation is mainly borne by the farmers, the most disadvantaged party in this process, which would 
inevitably cause basic living and social security problems among the land-lost farmers. In addition, 
industrialization and urbanization also brought about serious environmental pollution. In short, all the 
aforementioned problems would require the government’s regulation and policies and redistribution 
compensation, that is, the grave challenges and pressing tasks that China currently faces in national 
governance.    
xxx
What is worth clarifying is that, although the reasons for and contents of the governance crises were 
almost similar in the same development stage (e.g. the industrial or post-industrial stage) of different 
 The weakening of the traditional ideology and the diversification of social values made 
radical intellectuals more influential and guarantee their right of speech. The extension of public media 
coverage and the popularity of the network enlarged people’s horizons and facilitated the mutual 
communication; the awareness of participation, social equity and rights and interests was disseminated 
among the common people. The combination of these social and cultural changes with the increasing 
social contradictions and conflicts gave rise to various forms of social petitioning and action to protect 
legal rights. In particular, the rapidly increasing “Shangfang” (means appeal to the higher authorities for 
help), petition, resistance and other types of “mass events” induced are a unique “new social movement” 
characteristic of China’s transitional period. Faced with the mountainous variety of social petitioning and 
“non-institutional involvement”, the decision-making authority of the governments (local governments in 
particular) was impaired, the administrative burden increased and the executive power weakened at large. 
The maintenance of social stability, and the improvement of the Communist Party’s governability and the 
government’s responsive capability has become the primary focus of China’s transitional governance and 
was reiterated once and again in various party and government documents.  
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countries’ transition, the countries varied in governance regulation, owing to their different historical, 
cultural and political formation and development experiences. As some Western scholars dedicated to the 
study of China’s transition found, compared with the former socialist countries such as East Europe and 
Russia, when facing multiple governance crises during the transitional period, the Chinese government 
did not retreat, but has been exploring appropriate strategies; that is, the state is trying to adapt its 
governance model to the economic-social transformations and changes by way of reform.
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxi This strategy 
is related to China’s political tradition and the governance resources available. China has a long tradition 
and culture of unified and centralized “strong nation” governance model. The totalism country based on 
the planned economy incorporated every aspect of economic, social and individual life into the state 
organization and control after 1949.  Ever since the reform and opening-up from 1978 which initiated 
China’s progressive marketization process and political democratization process, the country’s monopoly 
in the fields of economy and social lives was gradually removed and the control over the areas of politics 
and ideology loosened. After 30 years’ adoption of the reform and opening-up policy, the national state of 
totalism was gone. But in general, the country was not retreating from the economic and social domains, 
but was trying to adapt to the marketization and social transformations and reconstruct the national 
governance system through ongoing institutional reform and policy regulation. The state still occupied a 
dominant position in the marketization and social transformation.  
 
For example, China’s economic 
liberty during the early stage of transformation and the popularity of market economy ever since the 1990s 
has been carried through with the state intervention. While non-state-owned economy was developing by 
leaps and bounds, the state-owned economy was confronted with material crises; hence the state put 
forward the reform strategy of “invigorating larger enterprises while relaxing control over smaller ones”, 
and implemented “ownership transfer” (privatization or non-public ownership) to lessen the financial 
burden of the government, and focus on the reform of and support for the large and medium-sized SOEs 
that were of strategic significance to the national economy and the society. It turned out that the state 
successfully rebuilt these enterprises which were the pillar of the national economy and a main force 
involved in international competition. With China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, it enlarged its degree of 
economic opening-up to the outside and strived to adapt to the new changes by way of a series of reforms 
aimed at altering the government’s functions. With the development of the market economy and the 
change of the social structure, a new social stratification appeared and started to exert increasing influence 
over the national political and policy. Meanwhile, the state was making new adjustments in the 
institutional and policy fields to attract the new class of elites and pacify the socially disadvantaged class. 
Of course, the state dominance could not be divorced from the reform of the governance system. The 
various economic and social problems caused by the economic reform are in essence political problems 
that need to be addressed and settled through the reform of the political institutions. 
3. China’s Incremental Democratic Transition and State Governance 
The democratic transition of developing countries is an important part of the comparative politics. The 
definition of democratization from earlier literature on the political transition preferred the comparatively 
simple understanding of political typology “democracy being the opposite of despotism”, while the 
majority of literature would tend to view “democratization as the process of replacing democracy with 
despotism”.xxxiv This simplified concept of political transition not only had theoretical biases, but failed to 
explain the diversity of political transitions among different countries; it also dispelled the theoretical 
possibility of incremental political reform and stable transition. As “transition” was seen as the alternation 
and substitution of two opposite political types, democratization was regarded as the process of the 
continuous political battle which involved both the political elites and the common people, leading to the 
overthrow of existing regime by the people-elected government and alteration of the political system. 
However, even among countries with a democratic system and the tradition of democratic elections such 
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as Latin America, there were frequent emergencies and political instability, triggering pessimistic mood 
and scepticism over whether democracy could be strengthened among scholars favouring teleology and 
political typology.  
The rise of the third wave of democratization in the second half of the 20
xxxvi. Based on the bottom line and standards for democracy from Western democratic 
experience,
xxxvii
xxxviii
xxxix
th century made these scholars 
regain confidence for democracy, which came from the sharp increase of democratic countries. The 
bottom line and procedures of democracy put forward by Huntington in 1993 required relatively free and 
fair elections for multiple parties to for compete control over the government. xxxv  Danilo Zolo 
summarized the discussions of classical and modern democracy theorists and defined the requisite 
characteristics of a democratic regime as “the competition of diversified political elite groups for 
established leadership; an alternate solution of an insightful common view capable of judging politics; 
free elections, namely to grant the citizens genuine power to decide the result of political 
competition” 
 as of the mid-1990s, the number of democratic countries had grown from 35 wealthy 
industrial countries in the West in 1974 to more than 120 including some developing countries.  
However, when studying further the actual conditions of emerging democratic countries, many 
researchers found that such countries had problems in the political structure and governance performance. 
In particular, the defects of the democratic system in Latin America and the high social costs (mainly 
reflected in the crises of growth and distribution) paid for the political transition in East European 
countries and Russia as well as the political turmoil which had evoked such pessimistic views. As for the 
livelihood in Latin America, some scholars began to think that “the occurrence of the democratic 
transition is one thing while its continual existence is another”  . Others claimed that democratic 
countries can never be thoroughly consolidated, as there was no way to know the breakdown edge of the 
self-occurring consensus.  The high social costs for the East European and Soviet political transition 
also aroused pessimism against the democratic and market-based transformation.xl On the basis of the 
democratic criteria identified by Western democratic experience, Zolo described “the Singapore model” 
as the theoretical nightmare for Western democracy thought. Through the analysis of the Singapore model, 
he raised a bold question: whether the Singapore model would become a political form that Western 
democratic countries were quickly turning to and whether the Asian authoritarianism would become the 
sole way out for today’s Western democratic countries and welfare states in face of crises.xli
Thus, it can be seen that the political transformation theories of Western teleology and political 
typology have obvious discrepancies and even paradox with the developing countries’ transformational 
experience, which thus can not serve as satisfactory explanations for the democratic process in Latin 
America, Ea st Europe, Soviet Union and East Asia, especially for China’s 30 years’ transitional 
characteristics. In his article published in 1997 on the fourth issue of The Journal of Democracy, 
Huntington recognized that it was wrong to equate democracy with elections. He further divided 
democratic countries into Western free democracies and non-Western unfree democracies. He admitted 
that the Western democracy was based on the Western political tradition, while East Asia had its own 
political tradition. Meanwhile, he emphasized that the traditional criteria for Western human rights, 
freedom and the rule of law was different from the non-Western democratic experience
xliii
    
xlii This indicated 
to some extent that democratization and political transformation were concepts with ambiguity and 
different interpretations, and also with some ideological bias and discrepancy between Western countries 
and developing countries.  Empirically, the sustainable democratization process was not a unitary 
political process driven by the awakening of democratic awareness and the establishment of values, nor 
was it merely the process driven by exterior forces such as the so-called “demonstration” and ‘snowball” 
summarized by Huntington in The Third Wave. Sustainable democratization should be more intrinsic, 
driven by a realistic governance need and feasible strategy selection by the key participants, and restricted 
by the economical environment and existing institutional conditions. Sustainable democratization should 
be based not only on democratic values, but the pragmatic basis of democratic governance. Without good 
governance, democracy cannot get consolidated and work properly.           
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China’s democratic transformation started from 1978 when the Chinese Communist Party fine-tuned 
its political strategy and established the policy of reform and opening-up. After a decade of political 
turmoil and shock brought about by the “Great Cultural Revolution”, China’s state governance was in the 
critical condition of “awaiting rejuvenation”. To realize the national modernization and reconstruct 
political validity, the leadership from the Communist Party and the state level reached the political 
consensus of promoting “democratic and legal construction” and implementing the “reform and opening-
up” policy. From the 1980s on, the democratization of the political life and the legalization of the state 
governance became the key route of China’s political development. This transformation was featured by 
two obvious characteristics in its development procedure, that is, adherence to the Party’s leadership and 
the adoption of the incremental reform policy. To begin with, adherence to the Party’s leadership involved 
insisting on the Chinese Communist Party’s status as the ruling Party and supporting the Party leaders’ 
political authority. The Party’s ruling status has been regarded as the important guarantee of political 
stability and economic development. Ever since the reform and opening-up, the key leaders of the Party 
have been reiterating that China should not fully duplicate the Western model to democracy. The political 
reform should not be aimed at weakening the Party’s leadership and changing the existing system, but at 
refining and strengthening the Party’s leadership and governance capability, enhancing the validity of the 
national political system, structure and policies, and bringing the superior qualities of the existing system 
into play.xliv Any reform should be devised and operated pursuant to China’s actual political need and 
adjusted effectively in terms of the timing and content as required. As a matter of fact, China’s political 
system reform is a top-down political process driven and dominated by reform leaders, with a view to 
reforming and transforming the existing political operation system without fundamentally changing the 
existing political system. At the early stage of the political transformation, the political reform was 
basically a policy-driven process dominated by the core leadership, when the democratization process was 
decided not only by the political preference and determination of the leadership, but by their judgements 
over the pros and cons of the political reform and the consequences of the political uncertainties. But 
when in face of serious crises in political development, the core leadership system played a critical role in 
maintaining political stability. With the transition of the market economy, the increasing diversification of 
the society, and the development toward the “reverse” social protection movement starting from the mid 
1990s, China’s political system reform has also undergone top-down and bottom-up interaction in terms 
of policy selection, when the Party’s leadership still occupied a dominant position. Secondly, in terms of 
the specific policy selection and implementation of political reform and institutional transition, the 
Chinese leaders adopted the progressive or trial strategy, which was vividly depicted as “crossing the river 
by feeling the stones”xlv
China’s political system reform and the democratization process basically went through three stages. 
The first stage (1978-1989) marked the beginning of political system reform and democratization, 
characterized by political “deregulation” and rationalization, and the reconstruction of the Party and state 
governance system. The Third Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC decided that the 
basic guideline of the Party would no longer be class conflicts, but the transfer of the focus to economic 
development. Through a major shift away from the ultra-left wing thought and political and social policies 
of the “Cultural Revolution”, the Party and the state alleviated the political intervention over people’s 
social life. Mostly, the Party adopted an easy attitude towards the intellectual and other social classes. 
Thanks to the new policy, around 3 million people were re-examined politically or their political ‘labels” 
were removed. In various social and political activities such as job recruitment, promotion and enlistment, 
 at the early stage of the reform and opening-up. In fact, the actual conditions in 
China after the 10-year turbulence of the “Great Cultural Revolution” decided that political reform was 
more likely to be pursued through a incremental rather than radical approach. The experience of the 
Cultural Revolution in China made the senior leadership realize the potential risks of a radical reform, 
while the 10-year cyclical political turmoil before this period reinforced the leadership’s perception of the 
complexity and uncertainty of political reform and the consensus on and adherence to the gradual means 
of reform.     
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class background such as family origin was no longer that important. The institutional and ideological 
control over people was also greatly loosened. People began to have more choices for belief, expression 
and lifestyle. With the introduction of Western culture and ideas into China, considerable Western 
classical and modern works got translated into Chinese and then published. The intellectual were allowed 
(and sometimes even encouraged) to discuss some ideological, economic and political issues of the time 
in public.
xlvii
xlvi  The Party’s leadership also tried to increase public involvement into politics through 
“promoting socialist democracy”, mainly because some leaders in charge of the reform believed that due 
public participation in politics would be conducive to economic modernization and political stability.  
The rationalization of the Communist Party’s organization and government agencies was embodied in 
five basic aspects of the political system reform as follows: 1) to establish the collective leadership 
mechanism to strengthen and improve the Party’s capacity, and to reconstruct the Party-Government 
relationship through “separation of the party and government” in decision-making system; 2) to reinforce 
and develop the people’s congress institution and grant both the People’s Congress and the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) more substantial legislative power, so as to boost 
the construction of the legislative and legal systems; 3) to build up effective top-down working 
mechanism from the State Council to the local governments at all levels, and to establish legislative, 
disciplined and standardized government management system; 4) to overcome the bureaucratic workstyle 
and improve the governments’ management through streamlining the administrative structure; 5) to adjust 
the relations between the central and local governments, decentralize decision-making, personnel 
management and financial authority to some extent, and motivate the level of initiative of local and 
grassroots government organs.      
In 1979, the National People’s Congress passed the New Election Law aimed at improving local 
governments’ structure and the election process. It added some ingredients for democratic election, such 
as secret ballot, elections with more candidates than seats, etc and was put into practice in 1980. The 
county-level deputy to the people’s congress was elected through direct competition. The National 
People’s Congress was also granted more authority and obligations; many a special committee was thus 
set up and began to perform its function of discussing national policy and holding counsel with national 
officials. The democratic parties and political consultative meetings were also resumed.        
However, the initial stage of political reform was beset with many uncertainties. At the beginning of 
the reform, most people, whether determined reform leaders or enthusiastic scholars, had high 
expectations of China’s political system reform. They believed that, through democratic and legal 
construction, they could address the drawbacks of the old system, overcome the over-centralization of the 
traditional decision-making system and the bureaucratism of the government administrative system, and 
create a socialist democratic policy system with extensive political involvement of the people. However, 
as Nina Halpem analysed, the political motive of the reform leaders at the early stage was to set up a 
political system that was rationalized but still controlled by the Party, but their efforts were complicated 
by the increasing political diversification after Mao’s times.xlviii The emancipation of the mind across the 
nation and the political liberalization in the 80s broadened the space for political expression, while the 
reappraisal and severe criticism of past historical problems and social political conditions by the circles of 
thought and culture challenged to a great deal the mainstream thought and shocked continuously the 
ideological basis of the existing system. The progress of the political system reform was not optimistic to 
those with high expectations. Alongside the achievement made in party-government relations and the 
reform of government organs, people could still feel the profound obstruction from the giant bureaucratic 
system. The hindrance of the planned bureaucratic system that people encountered in the process of the 
market-oriented economic system reform necessitated the political system reform, while the market 
competition pressure and the change in the mode of allocation also kindled people’s discontent with the 
living conditions. The political disturbance incurred by cyclical students movement, the failure of the 
1988 price reform and the various corruption induced by the dual-track operation of the economic system 
130   Xu Xianglin /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  116 – 137 
further exacerbating social dissatisfaction, eventually resulted in the political “storm” in the spring of 
1989.   
    When the explicit political crisis quietened down, China’s political development entered into an 
important adjustment phase, namely the second stage of cautious political system reform period (1989-
1998). The 1989 crisis in China and the “institutional collapse” of the Soviet Union and East Europe 
caused by their political and economic system reform alarmed China’s communist leaders, and brought 
about uncertainties to China’s political reform fate as well. Even so, no significant major reversion 
occurred to China’s political reform. It began to prudently push forward the basic targets of political 
system reform for this stage and adjusted the order of priority for various objectives under more 
controllable preconditions. The political reform policy and strategy selection during this stage took 
political stability and national prolonged peace and order as high priority, and the construction of the 
Party and governance capability, rule of law and administrative system reform as the primary task. 
Following the rapid stabilization of the political order and the reshuffling of the leadership administration, 
the overall improvement and rectification was put in the first place. By emphasis on the basic principle of 
the “Four Insistences”, the furious left-wing and right-wing ideological debate was refrained, and the path, 
course and policy of the reform and opening-up established during the Third Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CPC, as well as the improvement and rectification guideline of the Third 
Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the CPC was upheld and carried forward. In terms of the 
self-construction of the Party, apart from the cultivation of the Party members’ theoretical quality and 
governance ability, the punishment of corrupt Party members was also strengthened in the legal and 
institutional construction level. Ever since the release of Dangzheng Lingdao Ganbu Xuanba Renyong 
Gongzuo Zanxing Tiaoli (Provisional regulation on of the Selection and Appointment of the Cadre from 
the Party and Government) in 1995 by the Central Government of the Communist Party, there has been 
some progress in the transparency and institutionalization of cadre management system of the Communist 
Party.xlix
The cautious reform was also bounded by the institutional structure, as every reform would concern 
deep-seated institutional issues. This is especially true with the acceleration of the economic growth and 
social transformation, when new economic and social contradictions flowed in and the traditional means 
for stability preservation have been out of efficiency, as the cost increased vice versa. The cautious reform 
also faced pressure inside and outside of the political system. Therefore, the political system reform must 
accelerate its pace to satisfy the demands originated from the variation of political, economic and social 
structures.  
 The legislation and supervision functions of the people’s congress was gradually extended and 
deepened. With respect to the government system, the issuance and implementation of the civil servant 
supervision system in early 1990s, and the periodic five-year reform plan for government organs and legal 
administration led to the remarkable progress of the government management system in terms of its 
functional transition, legal and institutional systems. Democratic reform was promoted in the rural area in 
terms of Villagers’ self-governance. In November 1998,Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa ( the Law on the 
Organization of Villagers Committee) was officially issued on the Ninth Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, as election has been generalized in recruiting cadres in the villages. The 
reform measures mentioned above have effectively mitigated the periodic social turmoil and guaranteed 
political stability during the first stage, which supplied factorable conditions not only for rectifying and 
stabilizing the economy but motivating the further development of it.  
The structural political system reform (1998-now) started from the sixteenth NPC. There seems much 
more challenges for the new generation of leaders. The market-oriented reform and relevant government 
system reform made it possible for China to maintain a high speed of economic growth in 20 successive 
years. However, the continuous economic prosperity also brought about a wide range of serious problems, 
which has been threatening China’s economic, social and even political stability. With China’s entry into 
the WTO, the country was under more pressure from the international economic system in terms of its 
economic system and government management system; China has been tagged as a “world factory” which 
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is confronting gigantic ecological, resource and environmental difficulties; the widening gap between the 
urban and rural areas and other different regions, the dilemma of the agricultural, rural and farmer issues 
and rural governance, the lags of social welfare and the redistribution have been bothering both the central 
and local governments. In particular, the polarization of social classes, the imbalance of the allocation 
mechanism, and the misconduct and corruption of officials has become serious potential problems to the 
social and political stability. When facing challenges from the economic-social structural changes, the 
new generation of leaders put forward brand new reform and governance concepts such as people-oriented 
policy and the construction of a harmonious society. They are also building up an effective social policy 
system, through major adjustments in the policy structure, so as to address many issues concerning 
people’s livelihood such as social allocation and public service.         
To further the reform of the political system is still a major political agenda for China. The 
development of a harmonious society requires that the national policy represents much more social 
equality and fairness, and that the citizens have more convenient political accesses to express their voices 
and getting the protection from a more comprehensive legal system; the government system should have 
more accountability to the society and validity in terms of administrative management, and the 
government agencies and officials should keep the party and government honest and clean so as to control 
political power according to law. As the sole legitimate ruling party, the Communist Party will play a 
critical and irreplaceable role in China’s political system reform with a focus on political stability. How to 
assure the Party’s advanced status and self-discipline? This is integral to the political reform. In the face 
of various problems and challenges, China’s political system reform in the new century has been 
promoted in a wider domain and with more specific policy forms. These reform measures include: the 
trial reform of the Party-wide democratic system and the standing Party Committee system; the promotion 
of government officials’ accountability system from the top to the bottom; the transparency and 
democratic trial reform in the selection and appointment of party cadres; the deepening of reform of the 
SCNPC system; the reform of the judicial system and the improvement of rural grassroot democratic 
elections; the trial reform of urban community construction, etc.       
In the 17th
In deepening the political system reform, the top priority would be to expand  intra-Party democracy. 
The political system will further enlarging the “voting system” with regard to major decision-making in 
the Party and improve the system of fixed terms within various levels of congress. The Standing 
Committee of the Communist Party will be supervised by the National Committee; there are vertical 
inspection systems in the central and provincial Party committee level, so as to expand democracy within 
the Party and strengthen supervision over authority, and to promote the development of people’s 
democracy through the advancement of democracy inside the Party. Secondly, regarding the deputy 
percentage of the People’s Congress among the urban and rural areas, we need to gradually practise the 
election of the NPC members based on the population percentage and eradicate the difference between the 
rural-urban difference, so as to increase the number of NPC deputies among farmers and reinforce their 
say in the national organs of power. Thirdly, it is necessary to develop democracy at the grassroots level, 
promote self-governance at the community level, enlarge the scope of self-governance and substantially 
boost the system of making government affairs transparent. Fourthly, we need to further deepening the 
reform of the legislative and judicial systems, build up the supreme authority of the Constitution and laws, 
 National Congress of the Communist Party in October 2007, General Secretary Hu Jintao, 
after summarizing the fruits of political reform that China had harvested since the reform and opening-up, 
put forward the statement of “developing socialist democratic politics and deepening the political system 
reform”. The major objectives of the reform were summarized as follows: 1) adherence to the political 
development path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, 2) adherence to the integration of the Party’s 
leadership, ruling by the people and governance by law, 3) adherence to and improvement of the people’s 
congress system, the multi-party cooperation system led by the Communist Party and the political 
consultative system, the regional autonomy system, and the system of community level self-governance, 4) 
the continuous advancement of the socialistic political system.  
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enhance the legal system with Chinese characteristics, promote the scientific and democratic development 
of the legislative and judicial systems, effectively address the defects of the existing legal system, and 
gradually tackle problems such as the severe executive intervention in the judicial system, the lack of 
public commitment in the rule of law, and the ranking, administrative, commercialization and localization 
issues of the existing judicial system. We also need to guarantee that the judicial and prosecutor organs 
exert their rights in an independent and just manner according to law and to strengthen supervision in 
terms of the implementation, so as to prevent some relevant departments concerned from obtaining undue 
interests through legislation. Fifthly, we shall foster the reform of the administrative system, explore the 
big-ministry system with integrated functions, and make the government agencies transform towards big-
ministry system, with broad functions and fewer organs, so as to deal with the problems of multiple 
administrative levels, overlapping of agencies and responsibilities, etc. In this way, the government 
administrative system and functions can change from regulation-oriented to service-oriented, from rule of 
man to rule of law, from centralization to decentralization. It can thus been seen that the political reform 
deployment of the Communist Party’s 17th
Under the context of the industrialization and modernization transformations, the political transition is 
a very complicated process, forming a multi-level interactive relationship with the economic development, 
social transition and even the change of values and ideology. In particular, the democratic transformation 
is usually closely related to the challenges of economic development, hence imbued with uncertainties. 
From the experience of the political and economic system transformations in developing countries over 
the past 30 years, we can see that in this worldwide transition process from authoritarianism to democratic 
governance, the countries all experienced national governance crises incurred by political uncertainties to 
a considerable agree. Hence, it is critical to reduce the political uncertainties, regulate the national 
governance system in a timely manner and improve the governance capability in the process of the 
political transformation. In this process, a radical reform would usually shock the entire operational 
system, thus possibly endangering the maintenance of the existing political system. Therefore, radical 
reform would cause reformers to lose control of the consequences of the reform and be faced with 
gigantic challenges of political uncertainties. Compared with radical reform, progressive political reform 
would only make limited adjustments over some aspects of the political system or some reform over 
certain areas of the political system. The influence of such kind of reform over the entire political system 
is not obvious in the short-term, and the plans and measures in each stage of the reform are also limited 
and incomplete, thus, it may be hard to realize the expected objectives. It may also bring about new 
problems, causing further reform to be fraught with difficulties. However, when seen from the entire 
progress, we may find that the progressive reform may have more room for change than the “shaky” 
radical reform, and is more likely to avoid the political disorder and collapse of the former Soviet system 
transformation. If the strategy and timing is appropriate, the problems and difficulties of the progressive 
reform can get settled through continuous reform exploration, and the social cost for the reform can also 
be addressed during the progressive process.        
 CPC was still carried through on two levels, the further 
democratic involvement on the level of the political structure and the rationalization of the system on the 
level of governance.  
In general, China’s political system reform over the past 30 years is an exploratory and evolutionary 
process. Under the leadership of the Party and the central government, through the interaction between the 
state and local, the government and the society, politics and economics, China’s political system has been 
continuously adjusting through reform, so as to better adapt to China’s economic and social development 
requirements. Such progressive reform maintained China’s political stability and rapid economic growth. 
Compared with the former Soviet Union’s radical political transformation, China’s path to 
democratization and legitimacy is going relatively smoothly, while the high social cost for the market-
oriented reform was also appropriately transferred during the progress of the progressive political and 
economic system reform. From the realistic point of view, China may have developed a special type of 
political transformation model through its political system reform experience.  
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What is worth noting is that, China’s progressive reform model is not the negative delay strategy that is 
taken for granted by some scholars; nor is it a “reluctant choice” in face of the dilemma of “the severe 
disadvantages of the political system” and the unexpected consequences of the political system reform. l 
Over the 30 years of progressive political system reform, China has developed a practical and unique 
model of its own, which came into being through continuous adjustment and adaptation in the process of 
the pragmatic political system reform and democratization. However, this model still needs re-
examination in practice and summarization and discussion in theory. But through the observation of 
existing experience, we could sum up this model as “the adaptive governance progressive reform model” 
in theory with the following characteristics: the advocates and participants of the reform can reach 
strategic reform consensus and rational policy selection in politics, fully utilize the effective national 
political and administrative resources to promote the economic reform and development, boost political 
reform step by step on the basis of political stability, adjust and reconstruct the national governance 
mechanism, and maintain the capability and adaptability of the national governance mechanism to deal 
with the transformational crises. In a research paper several years ago, I once analysed and discussed the 
limit and potention of China’s progressive political reform, and the five fundamentals to be maintained for 
the progressive reform. The ideas proposed in the paper can also serve as a theoretical perspective to 
observe China’s progressive reform model. li
 
 “The adaptive governance progressive reform model” can 
also be perceived from the structural elements of modern national governance, including the publicly 
recognizable core value system (ideology), the authoritative decision-making system, effective system of 
governance, orderly political involvement and beneficial interaction, moderate economic growth and 
social security system. In the adaptive reform process, good coordination and balance among  several 
important variants is very important, which can be seen as the relation between transformation and order, 
the change and continuity in ideology, the interaction between marketization and democratization, the 
social structural transformation and political structural adjustment, institutional innovation and efficiency 
in China’s 30 years of “adaptive governance incremental reform”. It is certainly impossible to get the so-
called perfection of efficiency and performance expected by institutional romanticists. But overall, such 
adjustment and balance is still stable and orderly. The transformation of the governance system can 
basically address the major challenges of the economic-social transformation with the model of crisis-
adjustment-adaptation. 
4. Tentative Conclusion 
From the analysis above, we can arrive at the conclusion that, the various economic, social and 
political problems that China currently faces will create huge pressure and some degree of governance 
dilemma for the existing national governance system, but there is no reason to believe that it will lead to 
the “breakdown” and “institutional collapse” of the existing system as predicted by some Western 
scholars. To begin with, Western developed countries also experienced similar governance crises in the 
different stages of their market-oriented development and modernization process, some even more serious 
than the current one in China, e.g., the large-scale class conflicts in America’s “progressive era”, the Great 
Depression between World War I and II, and the new social movement wave in the 1960s-1970s. It turned 
out that these crises did not cause the collapse of America’s basic political system, but promoted the 
transition and adjustment of the national governance system. Thus, it would be inappropriate to believe 
that similar transformational crises would necessarily bring about different results in another civilized 
society.     
Secondly, the political system collapse incurred by the national governance crises in former Soviet 
Union does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that China’s political system is about to disintegrate. 
David Kota and Fred Will, who have been long engaged in the study and observation of the Soviet 
Union’s economy and society, found that “the breakdown of the Soviet Union does not derive from the 
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public rebellion accompanying the economic collapse, but the chasing of individual interests by the ruling 
elites”. lii
Thirdly, China has not descended into the “transformational trap” of “partial reform”. Instead, it went 
through a progressive institutional transformation in politics and economics. On the economic side, the 
economic system has rid itself of the highly centralized directive planned economy and developed the new 
market economy system with Chinese characteristics; on the political side, the political system has turned 
from the highly centralized political system based on personal charisma to institutionalization, democracy 
and legitimacy. China’s progressive transformation is more rational and practical when compared with the 
radical transition model of the former Soviet Union in terms of the theoretical guidance, the adaptability 
and policy selection of the system.
 From the literature related to the political and economic system reform of the former Soviet 
Union, we can find that the dissolution of the Soviet system is, to a large extent, related to the policy and 
strategy selection of its reform. The failure of earlier economic policies induced more radical reform 
options. When radical reform was tenaciously resisted by the bureaucratic system, the elite class turned to 
promote the social democratization and motivate the masses in order to acquire the political support for 
the radical reform. The disorderly contest of power under the structure of the so-called election-based 
democracy added momentum to the more drastic political and economic reform, leading to violent tussle 
of power and the pursuit of special interests. The political system transformation in the former Soviet 
Union and the economic system transition under the guidance of ‘Washington consensus” all incurred 
expensive social costs. By contrast, China’s reform is a progressive process, with more focus on the 
coordination between the economic and political system reform.     
liii China’s step-by-step market transformation has not been confronted 
by the economic recession crises that many nations have experienced under “Washington consensus”; 
instead, it has accumulated some political legitimacy capital from the ongoing reform and opening up and 
economic growth. For instance, a survey on Chinese people’s consciousness of citizenship conducted in 
2008 by the Research Centre for Contemporary China, Peking University revealed that Chinese people are 
highly concerned about social equity and public service, but they respond positively when it comes to the 
evaluation of the reform and opening-up or national pride or in social political confidence, political 
efficiency and participation, etc. liv This situation is very similar to a survey conducted in the 1970s on the 
awareness of citizenship in major Western countries. lv An earlier study (published in 2005) by the Chinese 
American scholar Tang Wenfang also found that, although some Western scholars were pessimistic about 
China’s reform achievements and performance, Chinese people showed astonishing enthusiasm and 
support for their political structure and the ruling party. His conclusion that “China is neither crises-ridden 
nor prosperous” is generally widely accepted. lvi
The above statement is not a denial of the fact that China still has tremendous social problems and 
national governance challenges, but emphasizes that the study of China’s transformation should not start 
from an ideological perspective. In the review of the capitalism and socialism system during the Cold War 
period, Adam Przeworski once pointed out that the supporters of capitalism or socialism often tried to 
display one system’s superiority by reasoning the other’s defects. The ubiquitous poverty and oppression 
of capitalism was once the reason for support of the socialism; the inappropriateness of centralization was 
used to support capitalism. This kind of argument can only end when the following is true: all the 
problems of one system can be settled under the other.
  
lvii
China’s market economy and social transformation is still under way. As a developing country, the 
challenges it faces in terms of governance crises may be more complicated than that once faced by the 
developed countries, which can be partly attributed to the fact that the transformation of developing 
countries would face more restrictions, more pressure from the big powers and the international 
environment, as well as the larger influence from the pace of the modernization process. When the 
 This comment can also apply to the argument 
over the ideology of different political systems. What makes the difference is that, the several “ideological 
emancipation” ever since China’s reform and opening-up made the Communist Party and the government 
more rational in insisting on socialism with Chinese characteristics and learning from the advanced 
experience of the West.     
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Chinese government was busy dealing with the crises related to social issues and conflicts (e.g., social 
double-track movement) similar to that once occurred in the Western industrialized era, the post-modern 
“new social movement” has started to exert governance pressure on the national system. China still has 
numerous problems to face and handle in its transformational period, and the governance crisis will not 
disappear soon. However, China’s experience and learning capability accumulated in its 30 years of 
reform, coupled with the reservoir of good practices amassed in its economic development process still 
grants China the resources and time needed to tide over the transformational crises. 
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